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Abstract 
Firms cluster their economic activities to exploit technological and informational spillovers 
from other firms. Spillovers through the entry of multinational firms can be particularly 
beneficial to domestic firms because of their technological superiority. Yet, the importance of 
foreign firm's spillovers might depend on two key features of domestic firms: their 
productivity level and its export status. In line with theories and empirical evidence on the 
absorptive capacity of firms, we argue on the basis of an empirical analysis of Hungarian 
firms that larger and more productive firms are more able to reap spillovers from 
multinationals firms than smaller firms. The export status, in contrast, is of minor 
importance. 
JEL: F23, F14, D21, R12, R30 
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A termelékenység átterjedése multinacionális 
vállalatoktól heterogén hazai vállalatok felé: 
Magyarországi eredmények 
Gábor Békés - Jörn Kleinert - Farid Toubal 
Összefoglaló  
A vállalatok telephelyválasztási döntéseikben figyelembe veszik a közelségbĘl fakadó 
technológiai és információs externáliákat. A hazai tulajdonú cégek a jellemzĘen magasabb 
technológiai szintet képviselĘ multinacionális vállalatoktól átterjedĘ magasabb 
termelékenységbĘl húzhatnak hasznot. Ugyanakkor az átterjedési hatások jellege a hazai 
cégek két fontos jellemzĘjétĘl, a termelékenységi szinttĘl és az exportáló státusztól függ. Az 
abszorpciós kapacitás elmélete alapján és az eddigi empirikus eredményekkel összhangban a 
magyar vállalatok vizsgálata azt mutatta, hogy a nagyobb és termelékenyebb vállalatok 
jobban ki tudják aknázni a termelékenységi átterjedési hatásokat. Az exportáló státusz 
szerepe ugyanakkor a vártnál kisebb.  
 
Tárgyszavak: 
FDI, multinacionális nagyvállalatok, termelékenység, átterjedési hatások, régiók  
 
 1 Introduction
The large number of bilateral investment treaties between Central and East-
ern European countries and OECD countries agreed on during the nineties
suggests that political actors in the participating countries view multina-
tional ﬁrms as welfare increasing and growth enhancing. It is widely believed
that multinational ﬁrms increase competition, transfer technology and help to
achieve more eﬃcient allocation of resources. A major argument in this line of
reasoning is that inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increases domestic
ﬁrms’ productivity (and thus, enhances economic development) by creating
linkages among domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
Domestic ﬁrms can beneﬁt from the presence of multinationals in the same
industry through horizontal spillovers that might for instance arise through
the movement of workers within industries. In addition, there may be verti-
cal spillovers from multinationals operating in other industries. This type of
external eﬀect is usually attributed to buyer-supplier linkages. There are two
types of vertical spillovers: backward spillovers are generated through serving
customers in downstream industries; forward spillovers are generated through
sourcing from upstream industries.
Spillovers from foreign ﬁrms are measured through foreign ﬁrms’ eﬀect on do-
mestic ﬁrms’ total factor productivity (TFP). The TFP of a ﬁrm is the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc component of the ﬁrm’s technology. A higher TFP of a ﬁrm is the
result of several factors, such as better use of inputs, more sophisticated sales
methods, superior internal organizational structure or simply more knowledge
and information. When explaining TFP by spillovers, we make the assumption
that the presence of foreign ﬁrms creates additional information and oppor-
tunities and thereby enhances this ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of domestic ﬁrms’
technology. In the literature several channels of positive spillovers have been
identiﬁed, including labor mobility, supply chains, and face-to-face communi-
cation. Yet, while proximity to other producers, customers and suppliers can
create a cost advantage or an increase in productivity for a domestic ﬁrm, it
may also lead to increased competition and to the exit of domestic ﬁrms 1 .
The empirical literature on FDI spillovers ﬁnds mixed support for the positive
impact of multinational entry on domestic ﬁrms’ TFP (G¨ org and Greenaway,
2004). A large part of literature investigates the extent of horizontal produc-
tivity spillovers. Damijan et al. (2003), for instance, use ﬁrm level data for
several transition countries, including Hungary, and ﬁnd some evidence for
1 See Kosova (2006) for a study on the impact of FDI on exit of Czech ﬁrms
1positive spillovers only for Romania. For other countries, the spillover eﬀect
is either statistically insigniﬁcant or negative. Bosco (2001) analyzes the di-
rect and spillover eﬀects of foreign ownership on ﬁrms’ TFP in Hungary for
the period 1992-1997. She ﬁnds that horizontal spillovers are either insignif-
icant, or negative. According to Aikten and Harrisson (1999) and Konings
(2001), negative horizontal spillovers arise when multinational ﬁrms attract
demand away from domestic ﬁrms. This lack of sizable horizontal spillovers
from multinationals to domestic ﬁrms might be explained by the lack of ab-
sorptive capacity (i.e. the ability to assimilate and apply new knowledge) of
the latter (Girma et al. (2001)). Domestic ﬁrms may be unable to learn from
multinational ﬁrms if the technological gap between the two groups is wide.
Javorcik (2004) extends the spillover approach to backward linkages. Using
ﬁrm level panel data for Lithuania from 1996 to 2000, she ﬁnds evidence of
backward linkages. There is, however, no robust evidence from her analy-
sis that domestic ﬁrms beneﬁt from horizontal spillovers from multinational
ﬁrms. Blalock and Gertler (2003) ﬁnd the same evidence using Indonesian
plant-level data. Driﬃeld et al. (2002) examine the relative importance of hor-
izontal, backward and forward spillovers using an industry-level data for UK
manufacturing during 1984 - 1992. They show evidence for positive spillovers
through forward linkages. There are however no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
from horizontal spillovers or from backward linkages.
In this paper, we examine the impact of multinational ﬁrms’ presence on lo-
cal ﬁrm productivity and size. We assume that the presence of multinational
ﬁrms generates spillovers which are more important when geographical dis-
tance between multinational and domestic ﬁrms is small (Audretsch, 1998).
For Hungarian ﬁrms, this stance is supported by Halpern and Murak¨ ozy (2005)
who found strong positive spillovers that operate only on small distances (i.e.
broadly at the county level) for domestic-owned ﬁrms. At the national level,
backward spillovers are found signiﬁcantly positive suggesting that foreign
customers make domestically owned ﬁrms more productive (Halpern and Mu-
rak¨ ozy (2005)).
More speciﬁcally, we analyze whether more productive and larger ﬁrms are
able to reap more beneﬁt from spillovers of multinational ﬁrms. The spillovers
eﬀect might also diﬀer with respect to the export status of the domestic ﬁrm.
Exporters’ experience in export markets might explain why they deal bet-
ter with the spillovers of foreign multinational ﬁrms. However, it might also
be that the foreign multinationals’ spillovers at home are less important to
exporters, because they also learn from ﬁrms in the foreign market.
2We use a large and extensive data set on Hungarian manufacturing ﬁrms. The
data set crucially entails information on domestic and export sales as well as
ownership. Further, we have information on employment, capital and other
ﬁrm-level characteristics that enable us to compute the TFP of each domestic
ﬁrm. We work with an unbalanced panel of manufacturing ﬁrms for the period
1992-2003.
Our empirical analysis makes use of three variables which have to be con-
structed in a ﬁrst step. (i), we compute the TFP of domestic ﬁrms using
the semi-parametric Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology. (ii), we construct
the horizontal and vertical spillovers variables following Javorcik (2004). We
depart from her analysis by taking the extreme view that spillovers from multi-
nationals can only be reaped by domestic ﬁrms located in the same county.
(iii), we quantify the net eﬀects of spillovers by controlling for the degree of
competition. Therefore, we construct a Herﬁndahl index at sectoral and county
level.
We then estimate the eﬀect of multinationals’ spillovers on the average do-
mestic ﬁrm’s TFP using a ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects panel model. The ﬁrm speciﬁc
eﬀects allow the control of the ﬁrm’s technology and the isolation of the sec-
toral spillovers eﬀects. Finally, we are interested in the diﬀerence in the eﬀect
of spillovers on ﬁrms that diﬀer in productivity. We therefore estimate simul-
taneous quantile regressions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follow. In Section 2, we provide
information on the Hungarian dataset and the descriptive statistics. In Section
3, we present the estimation strategy. In Section 4, we discuss our results. We
conclude in Section 5.
2 Descriptive Statistics
In this section we present the data and analyze Hungarian ﬁrms’ productivity.
Our analysis is limited to manufacturing ﬁrms that meet the data require-
ments that will be described in the ﬁrst subsection. In the second subsection,
we discuss the distribution of Hungarian ﬁrms with respect to size and pro-
ductivity. As documented for other economies as well, exporters are larger and
more productive than domestic ﬁrms over the whole size distribution. Foreign
multinational ﬁrms are larger and more productive than exporters. Hence, it
is possible that Hungarian ﬁrms (non-exporter and exporter) learn from more
productive foreign multinational ﬁrms. In the third subsection, we therefore
3have a ﬁrst look at our main interest: the relationship of TFP and the number
of foreign multinational ﬁrms active in a particular Hungarian county.
2.1 Data
We use a Hungarian corporate dataset, which is based on annual balance
sheet data submitted to APEH, the Hungarian Tax Authority 2 . The dataset
contains information on all registered, double entry book-keeping ﬁrms. The
data include the information of a ﬁrm’s balance sheet and income statement.
It entails information on sales, employment, total assets, labor costs, and eq-
uity ownership. It also includes information on each ﬁrm’s sector classiﬁcation
(NACE rev-1, two-digit level) and on the location of the ﬁrm’s headquarter.
The data covers ﬁrms’ activities between 1992 to 2003.
In Hungary, economic transition has lead to the entry of new domestic and for-
eign ﬁrms. The number of ﬁrms has risen substantially from 55,213 in 1992 to
226,072 in 2003. The sample used in this study is less comprehensive than the
original APEH data for two reasons. First, we concentrate on manufacturing
ﬁrms. Second, very small ﬁrm data are unreliable and no complete informa-
tion exists on employment and ﬁxed assets, which are required to compute
the TFP variable. As a result, this sample contains 108,541 observations over
12 years, rising from 6,003 ﬁrms in 1992 to 11,208 in 2003. The dataset covers
42% of the total number of manufacturing ﬁrms and 73% of total turnover.
We use the subsample of domestically-owned ﬁrms. It includes 66,470 obser-
vations from 11,767 ﬁrms for the period from 1993 to 2002. Table (5) of the
Appendix shows the summary statistics for all domestically-owned ﬁrms in
our sample.
2.2 Total Factor Productivity, Domestic and International Activities
The data at hand allows discrimination between ﬁrms according to their export
status and their foreign ownership. We diﬀerentiate between four types of
ﬁrms in the APEH database: domestic non-exporting ﬁrms (hence domestic
ﬁrms), domestic exporters, foreign-owned non-exporting ﬁrms and foreign-
owned exporters. We use the foreign ownership information to compute our
horizontal and vertical spillover variables (see section 3.1) and focus on the
impact of multinationals’ spillovers on the productivity and size of domestic
2 See details in the Appendix
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ﬁrms. We deﬁne an exporter as a ﬁrm that exports at least 5% of its total
sales and a foreign owned ﬁrm as a ﬁrm with at least 10% foreign stake.
In 2002, the sample includes 8,650 domestically owned and 2,112 foreign owned
ﬁrms. Exporters account for 27% of domestically owned ﬁrms and 74.0% of for-
eign owned ﬁrms. The foreign presence in Hungarian manufacturing is rather
important, as domestic ﬁrms with foreign capital are responsible for 76.6% of
total sales in our sample (total sales of foreign ﬁrms reached about 28.6 billion
euros compared with about 8.7 billion euros by domestically owned ones).
Figure (1) shows that the distribution of Hungarian ﬁrms’ TFP is right skewed.
It is, however, not too far from log-normal. We have a closer look at the
heterogeneity of Hungarian ﬁrms using the results of Table (1). We split the
distribution of the logarithm of TFP in ﬁve intervals and report information
on the corresponding number of domestic ﬁrms, export status and sales.
Table (1) shows two interesting facts. First, the most productive ﬁrms are not
necessarily the largest with respect to sales. For both the ﬁfth and the forth
interval, the share of the interval sales in total sales is below their shares in
total number of ﬁrms. We expect sector diﬀerences behind this ﬁnding. Sec-
ond, export participation increases with productivity. The share of exporters
in total ﬁrms in the interval increases from 26.2% in the ﬁrst interval to 41.2%
in the ﬁfth. The increase is even more impressive if export activities are mea-
5Table 1
Breakdown of Hungarian Firms by Total Factor Productivity in 2000 (percentage
into bracket)






[−8.2,0] 61 16 4.E+06 6.45E+05
(0.69) (26.2) (0.05) (16.1)
[0,1] 395 107 2.E+08 7.51E+07
(4.46) (27.1) (2.36) (37.5)
[1,2] 5249 1738 5.E+09 3.07E+09
(59.26) (33.1) (64.14) (61.4)
[2,3] 2995 1232 3.E+09 1.99E+09
(33.82) (41.1) (32.49) (66.3)
[3,6.3] 157 65 8.E+07 5.90E+07
(1.77) (41.4) (0.95) (73.8)
sured in export sales instead of number of exporters. Both measures suggest
that exporters are more productive than non-exporting domestic ﬁrms. The
qualitative results of Table (1) are robust to change in interval borders.
In Figure (2), we show the cumulative distribution of TFP and sales of Hun-
garian ﬁrms according to their export status. Panel (a) of Figure (2) points to
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance of exporters with respect to sales. Exporters
are selling more than domestic ﬁrms over the whole distribution. The ﬁrst-
order stochastic dominance of exporters with respect to TFP is, however, not
obvious from Panel (b) of Figure (2).
We use the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test) to determine
whether the sales and TFP distributions between the two groups diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly. The KS-test calculates the largest diﬀerence between the observed and
expected cumulative frequencies, which is called D-statistics. These statistics
are compared against the critical D-statistic for the sample size. The results
of the two-sided KS-test are shown in Table (2).
Concerning the sales distribution, the largest diﬀerence between the distri-
bution functions is 0.3034, which is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%. Thus, the
null hypothesis that both sales distributions are equal is rejected. From the
left hand-side of the KS-test we can reject the hypothesis that domestic ﬁrms
are larger than exporters with respect to their sales. The largest diﬀerence
between the distributions functions is 0.3034, which is statistically signiﬁcant
at 1% level of signiﬁcance. From the right hand-side of the KS-test, we accept
the hypothesis that exporters are larger than domestic ﬁrms. The largest dif-
ference between the distributions functions is -0.0005, which is not signiﬁcant.
Therefore, we cannot reject the stochastic dominance of exporters’ sales dis-
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tribution over domestic ﬁrms’ sales distribution. However, we can reject the
stochastic dominance of domestic ﬁrms’ sales distribution over exporters’ sales
distribution.
We ﬁnd qualitatively similar results using the TFP distributions. Exporters’
TFP cumulative distribution with respect to TFP dominates stochastically
domestic ﬁrms’ TFP cumulative distribution.
As result, the KS-test of stochastic dominance suggests that exporters are
more productive than domestic ﬁrms and larger in size 3 .
3 Note that the KS-test results are qualitatively similar for each year of the sample.
72.3 TFP and Spillovers
Having documented that exporters are more productive than domestic ﬁrms,
we now turn to the most productive ﬁrms in Hungary: foreign multinational
ﬁrms. We are interested to see whether Hungarian ﬁrms (non-exporters and
exporters) can learn from foreign multinational ﬁrms or use their proximity
in another way to increase their productivity. We therefore ﬁrst look at the
productivity gap. A productivity gap is the ﬁrst necessary condition for pos-
itive spillovers. Then we look at multinationals’ geographic location relative
to Hungarian ﬁrms. Geographic proximity is the other necessary condition for
spillovers.
We use again the KS-test to determine whether the sales and TFP distribu-
tions of foreign owned and domestically owned ﬁrms diﬀer signiﬁcantly. We
present the comparison of foreign owned ﬁrms and the group of Hungarian
exporters, which are more productive than Hungarian non-exporters. The re-
sults of the two-sided KS-test are shown in Table (3). The KS-test reveals
that the size of the distribution of foreign multinational ﬁrms stochastically
dominates those of Hungarian exporters. Thus, the ﬁrst necessary condition
for positive spillovers is met. Concerning the second necessary condition, we
look at the regional distribution of foreign owned ﬁrms. Figure (3) shows that
Western counties have a higher share of foreign ﬁrms, while the Eastern and
South-Eastern counties have a rather low share of foreign owned ﬁrms.
Next, we look at the relationship of the share of multinational ﬁrms in total
ﬁrms in a particular county and the TFP of Hungarian ﬁrms in that county.
We regress the logarithm of ﬁrm level TFP of domestic ﬁrms on the share of
Table 2
KS-Test of Diﬀerences between Exporters and Domestic ﬁrms, Sales and TFP, 2000
Sales
Group Largest P-value Corrected
Diﬀerence
Ho : Exp − Dom ≤ 0 0.3034 0.000
Ho : Dom − Exp ≤ 0 -0.0005 0.999
Combined K-S 0.3034 0.000 0.000
TFP
Group Largest P-value Corrected
Diﬀerence
Ho : Exp − Dom ≤ 0 0.0918 0.000
Ho : Dom − Exp ≤ 0 -0.0014 0.995
Combined K-S 0.0918 0.000 0.000
8Fig. 3. Regional distribution of foreign owned ﬁrms, share in percent
Source: APEH, authors’ computation.
multinational ﬁrms in sector j of county l, Njlt.
TFPit =0.0692
∗∗∗Njlt + νj + νl + νt (1)
From this very crude ﬁrst inspection, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between a
higher share of multinational ﬁrms and ﬁrm-level TFP. The share of multina-
tional ﬁrms and the ﬁxed eﬀect explains 49.67% of the TFP’s cross variation.
Table 3
KS-Test of Diﬀerences between foreign multinational ﬁrms and Hungarian Ex-
porters. TFP, 2000
TFP
Group Largest P-value Corrected
Diﬀerence
Ho : MNE − Exp ≤ 0 0.0474 0.020
Ho : Exp − MNE ≤ 0 -0.0111 0.809
Combined K-S 0.0474 0.041 0.037
93 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we describe measurement of productivity, detail the spillover
variables and give an account of our estimation strategy.
3.1 Horizontal and Vertical Spillovers
The total factor productivity of a ﬁrm reﬂects its own technology. Apart from
its own technology, the productivity of a ﬁrm might also be aﬀected by sectoral
linkages and local competition. In this study, we examine the eﬀect of hori-
zontal spillovers, of backward and forward linkages and of local and sectoral
competition on ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. Thereby, we describe the logarithm
of the TFP of a domestic ﬁrm i, in sector j located in a county l at time t,
TFPijlt, as follows
TFPijlt =αHjlt + β1Bjlt + β2Fjlt + γCjlt + χPshit + νi + νj + νt (2)
TFPijlt has been computed using the semi-parametric estimation suggested
by Olley and Pakes (1996). The methodology is developed in Appendix A. It
allows to take into account the endogeneity of the inputs in the production
function. The endogeneity issue arises because inputs are chosen by a ﬁrm
based on its productivity.
Hjlt, Bklt, Fklt and Cjlt represent local Horizontal spillovers, local Backward
and Forward linkages and local and sectoral Competition, respectively. 4 We
focus on spillovers and competition within a speciﬁc county and assume that
they arise from the presence of multinational ﬁrms in the same county. The
variable Pshit stands for the Privatization share at ﬁrm-level (that may change
year by year). Since we want to quantify the impact of spillovers at sectoral
level on ﬁrm-speciﬁc total factor productivity, we control for the technology
of the ﬁrm by introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects, νi. Since the ﬁrm speciﬁc TFP
might also be driven by unobserved sectoral speciﬁc shocks, we include a
set sectoral dummy variables, νj. We also assume that ﬁrm-speciﬁc TFP is
aﬀected by macroeconomic shocks and include a set of time dummy variables
νt to control for it. In addition, the time dummy variables control for the
average change of productivity that is not due to the spillovers.
Horizontal spillovers occur when entry or presence of multinational ﬁrms lead
4 Competition as an inﬂuential force on productivity was used e.g. in Nickell (1996).
10to an increase in productivity of domestic ﬁrms active in the same industry.
This results, for instance, in intra-sectoral movement of workers who take some
industry-speciﬁc knowledge with them. As in Javorcik (2004), we assume that
horizontal spillovers increase with the foreign presence in sector j at time t. We
assume, however, that horizontal spillovers are county-speciﬁc. We proxy the
potential for spillovers by the share of multinational ﬁrms in total activities.
For each county l, Hjlt is deﬁned as foreign equity participation averaged over
all ﬁrms in the sector, weighted by each ﬁrm’s share in sectoral output. We












where shareit is the share of ﬁrm’s total equity that is foreign owned. Yit is
the output of ﬁrm i at time t.
Vertical spillovers occur when multinational ﬁrms’ presence in backward or for-
ward industries increases the eﬃciency of a ﬁrm through vertical input-output






where θjk is the proportion of industry j’s output shipped to sector k. This
information is taken from the 1998 input-output table at two-digit NACE level.
As in Javorcik (2004), the output delivered within the sector is not included
in the computation since this eﬀect is already captured by the horizontal
spillovers variable.






θjm is the share of inputs purchased by industry j from industry m in total
inputs purchased by industry j. We again exclude the input purchased within
the sector because these linkages are captured by the horizontal spillovers
variable.
We approximate a potential competition eﬀect by the Herﬁndahl index. We
calculate the Herﬁndahl indices for all year, sector and county combinations
11and denote it Cjlt. We expect competition to exert a positive eﬀect on TFP.
The mode of ownership might also inﬂuence the TFP of domestic ﬁrms. Ac-
cording to Brown et al. (2006), privately owned ﬁrms are more eﬃcient than
state-owned ﬁrm. We therefore control for the mode of ownership at ﬁrm level
by including the privatization share.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
The heterogeneity in the ﬁrm-level data is large. This suggests that we must
take it explicitly into account when studying the eﬀects of multinational
spillovers on domestic ﬁrms. We deal with this large heterogeneity in our em-
pirical analysis in two ways. First, we look at the average impact of spillovers
and competition on domestic ﬁrms. Therefore, we use a ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects panel
model. While ﬁrm heterogeneity is collected in the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, coeﬃ-
cients of Hjlt, Bjlt, Fjlt and Cjlt give the average eﬀects of spillovers and
competition. Thus, we ﬁrst ignore diﬀerences in the eﬀect of spillovers and
competition among ﬁrms. Second, we allow spillovers and competition eﬀects
to diﬀer between well deﬁned groups of ﬁrms but not among ﬁrms within each
group. We do this by estimating a simultaneous quantile regression model. Un-
like the least squares estimator that assumes covariates shifting the location
of the conditional distribution only, quantile regression allows us to analyze
the possible eﬀects on the shape of the TFP distribution.
In the ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are
always potential problems. The bias is larger the longer the time horizon.
Since we have short time-series and a large cross-section, it is appropriate to
use cluster-sample methods (Wooldridge, 2003) to estimate the ﬁxed-eﬀects
model. Cluster-sample methods are a generalization of White’s (1980) robust
covariance matrices (Arellano, 1987). The obtained robust variance matrix
estimator is valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
provided that, as in our case, T is small compared to the number of groups
(Wooldridge, 2002, 2003). The ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimation allow to con-
trol for the unobserved domestic ﬁrm heterogeneity in the sample. Since our
endogenous variable is an estimate itself, we bootstrap the standard errors
in a robustness check. This does not alter the signiﬁcance of the estimated
coeﬃcients.
As we have shown in Section 2.2, exporting ﬁrms are more productive than
non-exporters. That might on the one hand decrease the potential for learn-
ing from foreign multinational ﬁrms, because more productive ﬁrms are al-
12ready closer to the most eﬃcient technology. On the other hand, learning
might be easier because the absorptive capacity of more productive ﬁrms is
larger. Hence, exporters might be aﬀected diﬀerently by foreign multinational
ﬁrms’ spillovers than non-exporting domestic ﬁrms. Moreover, there is a sec-
ond dimension why exporters might reap spillovers to a larger degree: their
international experience. Being used to interactions with partners in foreign
countries might also ease interaction with foreign multinational ﬁrms at home.
We therefore test whether spillovers have a diﬀerent eﬀect on exporters than
on non-exporting domestic ﬁrms.
The simultaneous quantile regression methodology allows a closer look at the
impact of the spillovers on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms. We split the
ﬁrms into twenty groups sorting them with respect to their productivity. We
assume ﬁrms in each group are aﬀected identically by spillovers and by com-
petition. The bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix takes into account the
errors correlation between the diﬀerent quantiles and allows us to compare co-
eﬃcients of the explanatory variables in the diﬀerent quantiles (Koenker and
Hallock, 2001). Hence, we test whether spillovers and competition have diﬀer-
ent impact in diﬀerent groups. We estimate a simultaneous quantile regression
model, which is speciﬁed as
QuantΘ (TFPijlt|Xijlt) = X
′
ijltβΘ
where Xijlt is the vector of independent variables speciﬁed in equation (2)
and QuantΘ (TFPijlt|Xit) the conditional quantile of TFP. The distribution
of the error term νijlt is left unspeciﬁed so the estimation method is essentially
semiparametric. Koenker and Basset (1978), introducing this technique, show











(1 − Θ)|TFPijlt − X
′
ijlt|}
The main advantage of the quantile regression approach is that it allows dif-
ferent slope coeﬃcients for diﬀerent quantiles of the conditional distribution
of the TFP variable to be estimated. Since Θ varies from 0 to 1, we trace the
entire distribution of TFP conditional on the set of independent variables. As
emphasized in Girma and G¨ org (2005), quantile regressions provide a robust
alternative to OLS when as in our case the error terms are non-normal. The
tests of normality of the TFP distribution, as well as a skewness and kurtosis
test, reject the log-normal distribution of TFP. Tests of normality reject a
log-normal distribution of establishment-level TFP for any given year and for
13all domestic-owned ﬁrms. 5
4 Results
Discussion of the estimation strategy is now followed by a presentation of main
results attained by both ﬁxed eﬀect panel and quantile regressions.
4.1 Average Impact of Spillovers on Domestic Productivity
First, we estimate the average impact of the spillover variables on the domestic
ﬁrm using a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects panel model. Since a ﬁrm does not change its sec-
tor and its county over time, the ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects are perfectly collinear with
the sector and county ﬁxed-eﬀects. We thus estimate equation (2) without
introducing sector and county ﬁxed-eﬀects. The results are presented in Table
(4). In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (S1), we show the results of the average spillovers
and the competition eﬀect on domestic ﬁrms and exporters. In the second
speciﬁcation (S2), the relative average impact of spillovers on TFP with re-
spect to the exporting status of the ﬁrm is analyzed. We separate the eﬀect of
spillovers from multinational ﬁrms on exporters and non-exporting domestic
ﬁrms by additionally including an interaction term between the spillovers vari-
ables and an exporter dummy variable, Exp, and an interaction term between
the spillovers variables and a non-exporter dummy variable, Dom.
Speciﬁcation (S1) of Table (4) shows that the average impact of horizontal
spillovers is positive and signiﬁcant. Therefore, the potential technology trans-
fer from multinationals to domestic ﬁrms in the same sector overwhelms the
competition eﬀect that arises from the multinational presence. The average
impact of forward spillovers is positive but remains statistically insigniﬁcant.
The coeﬃcient of the backward spillovers variable is very close to zero and
insigniﬁcant. Both the signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of horizontal spillovers and
the insigniﬁcant eﬀect of vertical spillovers diﬀer from Javorcik’s results on
Lithuanian ﬁrms. Turning to the average impact of competition on total factor
productivity, we ﬁnd that a higher Herﬁndahl index reduces the productivity
of domestic ﬁrms. Thus, as expected, more competition yields more productive
5 The Shapiro and Francia (1974) test, designed for a smaller sample size, yields a
p-value of 0.000 to 0.013 for any given year and a p-value of 0.000 for all but two
sectors, while the skewness and kurtosis test of D’Agostino et al. (1990) for the
whole sample gave a p-value of 0.000.
14ﬁrms. Moreover, as found in Brown et al. (2006), the ﬁrm-level privatization
share has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on TFP.
The coeﬃcients of the Herﬁndahl index and the privatization share variables
are robust to the inclusion of the interaction term between the spillover vari-
ables and the export status dummy variables (speciﬁcation (S2) of Table (4)).
We do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant impact of horizontal spillovers from
multinational ﬁrms to exporters, while the coeﬃcient of the interaction term
between the horizontal spillovers variable and the domestic ﬁrms is statistically
Table 4
Firm-Level Fixed Eﬀects Panel Regression with lnTFP as Dependent Variable:,
Labels (S1) (S2)
Horizontal Spillovers Hjlt 0.0411**
(2.41)
Backward Spillovers Bjlt -0.0047
(0.10)
Forward Spillovers Fjlt 0.0392
(1.38)
Herﬁndahl Index Cjlt -0.0684** -0.0660**
(2.41) (2.34)
Privatization Share Pshit 0.0660*** 0.0660***
(4.25) (4.26)
Horizontal Spillovers×Exporter Hjlt × Exp 0.0344
(1.64)
Backward Spillovers×Exporter Bjlt × Exp 0.1681***
(2.60)
Forward Spillovers×Exporter Fjlt × Exp 0.0181
(0.55)
Horizontal Spillovers×Domestic Hjlt × Dom 0.0437**
(2.36)
Backward Spillovers×Domestic Bjlt × Dom -0.0545
(1.10)
Forward Spillovers×Domestic Fjlt × dom 0.0426
(1.44)
Time Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66470 66470
Number of groups 11767 11767
R-squared 78.70 79.00
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering around the ﬁrm’s identity.
∗∗∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at one percent level od signiﬁcance.
∗∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance.
∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at ten percent level of signiﬁcance.
15signiﬁcant. For backward linkages, the average impact is positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant for the exporters only. thus, while the results for Hungarian
exporters are similar to Javorcik’s ﬁndings. The results for non-exporters, in
contrast, diﬀer.
4.2 Impact of Spillovers on Heterogenous Domestic Firms
The results of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation suggest that no vertical spillovers
exist from multinational ﬁrms to domestic ﬁrms. A close look at domestic
ﬁrm-level heterogeneity might reveal that spillovers from multinationals af-
fect diﬀerent ﬁrms diﬀerently depending on their productivity. We split the
distribution of the logarithm of TFP in twenty quantiles and estimate a si-
multaneous quantile regression. We assume therefore that spillovers and com-
petition eﬀects diﬀer between groups of ﬁrms but not within each group. The
estimation results are presented in Figure (4). In each subﬁgure, we present
the estimated coeﬃcient of each variable on the vertical axis and the corre-
sponding quantile of lnTFPijlt on the horizontal axis. The ﬁrst quantile of the
distribution contains information on the least productive ﬁrms, while the last
quantile contains information on the most productive ﬁrms.
The results show that horizontal spillovers have a negative impact on the least
productive ﬁrm. This impact is, however, positive and signiﬁcant for the most
productive ﬁrm. Moreover, the impact is larger, the more productive is the
domestic ﬁrm. There are two reasons for this ﬁnding. First, the negative eﬀect
on the least productive ﬁrm stems from their low level of absorptive capacity.
Second, competition from multinational ﬁrms, which leads to exit of the least
productive ﬁrms, stimulate innovation among domestic ﬁrms that have high
level of productivity (Aghion et al, 2005). Hence, we argue that the larger the
productivity gap between the domestic and foreign ﬁrms, the less likely is the
domestic ﬁrms to gain from foreign multinational ﬁrms in its own sector.
We ﬁnd a negative impact of backward spillovers on the least productive ﬁrm,
whereas this impact is positive and signiﬁcant for the more productive ﬁrms.
The positive impact of backward linkages is increasing with the productivity
of the domestic ﬁrm. Multinational ﬁrms might have a higher incentive to
transfer knowledge to more productive ﬁrms in their downstream sectors in
order to obtain higher sales through higher quality or less expensive goods.
Moreover, the increase in foreign presence in the upstream sectors redirects
intermediate inputs supply to the downstream sectors away from least pro-
ductive ﬁrms toward more productive ﬁrms in the downstream sector. This
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explains the negative coeﬃcient of backward spillovers on the TFP of least
productive ﬁrms. The increasing horizontal and backward spillovers with do-
mestic ﬁrms’ productivity is in line with Girma and G¨ org’s (2005) ﬁndings on
UK establishment.
Contrary to Javorcik (2004), we ﬁnd a positive although small impact of for-
ward spillovers on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms. The eﬀect is larger for
the least productive ﬁrms and insigniﬁcant for the most productive ﬁrms. The
positive eﬀect might stem from a higher quality of inputs purchased from
multinational ﬁrms.
Turning to the Herﬁndahl index, it has a positive but insigniﬁcant impact on
the least productive ﬁrms and a negative impact on TFP of more productive
ﬁrms. Finally, the data suggest a positive correlation between the privati-
zation share and the level of productivity of domestic ﬁrms. The impact of
privatization is larger the less productive the domestic ﬁrm.
174.3 Impact of Spillovers on Exporters and Non-exporters
We separate the eﬀect of spillovers from multinational ﬁrms on exporters and
non-exporting domestic ﬁrms by additionally including an interaction term
between the spillovers variables and an exporter dummy variable and an in-
teraction term between the spillovers variables and non-exporter dummy vari-
able.
The results are reported in Figure (6). The upper panel of Figure (6) show that
the coeﬃcients of spillovers from multinational ﬁrms to all domestic ﬁrms are
mainly driven by spillovers to non-exporting ﬁrms. Figure (4) and the upper
panel of Figure (6) are very similar. The middle panel shows the coeﬃcients
of the spillovers eﬀect on exporters. The bottom panel shows the coeﬃcients
of Herﬁndahl index and of the privatization share variables.
We can statistically distinguish the impact of spillovers from multinational
ﬁrms by the export status of domestic ﬁrms for some quantiles. Most non-
exporting Hungarian ﬁrms receive horizontal spillovers from multinational
ﬁrms. The eﬀect of spillovers on TFP increases in productivity.
As for backward linkages, non-exporters gain from positive spillovers if their
productivity places them at least in the third decile. The exporters pattern
has a slight U shape, but signiﬁcant gain from productivity takes place in the
upper third of the distribution only. Forward spillovers are very similar for the
two categories, slightly positive or zero, for both groups.
The productivity advantage of exporters which we reported in Section 2 there-
fore does not result from higher spillovers that exporters as such receive from
multinational ﬁrms relative to non-exporters.
In line with the results from the ﬁxed eﬀects regression, the quantile regres-
sions revealed no larger spillovers for exporters than for non-exporting domes-
tic ﬁrms. Hence, larger spillovers from multinational ﬁrms are not part of the
explanation why exporters have higher total factor productivity. Thus, while
exporters might receive additional spillovers in the foreign market which in-
creases their TFP, we did not ﬁnd support for higher spillovers received by
exporters at home.
There are three explanations for these ﬁndings. First and probably most im-
portant, the higher TFP of exporting ﬁrms relative to non-exporters is ex-
plained by the fact that more productive ﬁrms self-select into exporting. Sec-
ond, exporters might receive additional spillovers in the foreign market which
increase their TFP. Third, exporters might learn from foreign owned ﬁrms
18active in the Hungarian wholesale sector because they share a common ”trade
technology”.
For the ﬁrst two points have been examined in literature, we now test the valid-
ity of the third assertion by looking at the impact of the share of foreign-owned
ﬁrms in the Hungarian wholesale sector. Therefore, we construct a wholesale
spillover variable, Wjlt, that is the share of foreign ownership among ﬁrms that
operate in the wholesale sector and are exporters, Wjlt =
  





We ﬁnd a strong negative impact of foreign-owned importers on the least
productive domestic ﬁrms whereas this impact is positive and signiﬁcant for
most exporters. While domestic ﬁrms might suﬀer from import competition,
exporters might beneﬁt from foreign-owned importers’ trade knowledge.
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5 Conclusions
We examined the impact of the presence of foreign multinational ﬁrms in
local Hungarian markets on Hungarian ﬁrms’ productivity. We searched for
horizontal spillovers from multinational ﬁrms in the same sector, backward
spillovers from multinationals that are customers of Hungarian ﬁrms and for-
ward spillovers from multinationals that are input suppliers. We used a sample
of 11,767 Hungarian ﬁrms and their activities between 1993 and 2002. For this
sample, we found signiﬁcant horizontal spillovers in a ﬁrm level ﬁxed eﬀect re-
gression but no evidence of backward and forward spillovers.
Yet, the spillover eﬀects are average eﬀects over all ﬁrms which might not be
very informative if Hungarian ﬁrms are very heterogeneous and this hetero-
geneity aﬀects the size of the spillovers. We documented great heterogeneity
among Hungarian ﬁrms with respect to their productivity and size and ana-
20lyze whether more productive and larger ﬁrms are able to reap more beneﬁt
from spillovers of multinational ﬁrms than less productive smaller ﬁrms. We
used simultaneous quantile regression to analyze group speciﬁc eﬀects with
groups deﬁned with respect to productivity. We found signiﬁcant diﬀerences
among the groups with more productive ﬁrms receiving more horizontal and
backward spillovers from foreign multinational ﬁrms but less forward spillovers
than less productive ﬁrms.
There is a second obvious characteristic in which ﬁrms diﬀer: their export
status. Export status is not independent of productivity since only more pro-
ductive ﬁrms generate proﬁts in the export market. We expected export status
to have an eﬀect for two reasons. First, as argued above, exporters are more
productive. That might increase the spillovers reaped since the absorptive ca-
pacity is larger or decrease the spillover eﬀect because the gap to the most eﬃ-
cient ﬁrm is smaller. Second, exporters are used to interact with foreign ﬁrms
and therefore able to gain more from the presence of foreign multinational
ﬁrms in Hungary. In a ﬁxed eﬀects regression which separates the spillover
eﬀects on exporters and non-exporters, we found signiﬁcantly positive back-
ward spillovers of multinational ﬁrms on Hungarian exporters but no eﬀect
on Hungarian non-exporters. Horizontal spillovers in contrast were only sig-
niﬁcant for non-exporting ﬁrms. In line with the results from the ﬁxed eﬀects
regression, the quantile regressions revealed no larger spillovers for exporters
than for non-exporting domestic ﬁrms.
Overall, we found that heterogeneity in terms of productivity inﬂuences do-
mestically owned ﬁrms’ capacity to absorb knowledge and achieve higher pro-
ductivity. This ﬁnding may have policy implications regarding FDI subsidies,
a point left for future research.
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237 Appendix
7.1 Summary statistics
In table (5), summary statistics for all domestically-owned ﬁrms in our sample
are presented.
Table 5
Summary statistics of variables. Domestically-owned ﬁrms only
Mean Std. Dev.
Fixed assets (log) 8.324 1.967
Sales (log) 10.78 1.547
Materials (log) 9.468 1.579
Employment (log) 2.848 1.242
Domestic Sales (log) 10.80 1.562
Export Sales (log) 9.660 2.357
Export share 0.114 0.249
Exporter status (dum) 0.253 0.435
Horizontal Linkage 0.330 0.224
Backward Linkage 0.145 0.088
Forward Linkage 0.260 0.242
R&D Linkage 0.119 0.117
Wholesale linkage 0.262 0.192
Herﬁndahl index 0.137 0.152
Private share 0.974 0.149
TFP (log) 1.815 0.598
7.2 TFP Measurement methodology
We use the Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) semiparametric method to estimate
ﬁrm-level TFP. This method allows robust estimation of the production func-
tion. It takes into account the endogeneity of some inputs, the exit of ﬁrms as
well as the unobserved permanent diﬀerences among ﬁrms. The main assump-
tion the OP technique relies on, is the existence of a monotonic relationship
between investment and ﬁrm-level unobserved heterogeneity. Table (6) gives
an account of estimated coeﬃcients.
We consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + βmmit + ωit + ǫit
and denote the logarithm of output, capital, labor and intermediate inputs
24with yit, kit, lit mit, respectively. Subscripts i and t stand for ﬁrm and time,
ωit denotes productivity, and ǫit stands for measurement error in output. It is
assumed that ωit follow an exogenous ﬁrst order Markov process:
ωit+1 = E[ωit+1|ωt] + ηit+1
where ηit is uncorrelated with the productivity shock. The endogeneity prob-
lem stems from the fact that kit and lit are correlated with the ωit. This makes
βOLS to be biased and inconsistent. Given that investment is strictly mono-
tonic, it can be inverted as:
ωit = h(iit,kit)
and substituting this function in the production function leads to
yit = βllit + βmmit + Φ(iit,kit) + ǫit
where Φ(iit,kit) = β0+βkkit+h(iit,kit). Since the functional form of Φ(·) is not
known, we cannot estimate the coeﬃcients of the capital and labor variable
directly. Instead, we use a linear model that includes a series estimator using
a full interaction term polynomial in capital and investment to approximate
Φ(·). From this ﬁrst stage, the consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients on labor
and material inputs as well as the estimate of the polynomial in iit and kit are
obtained.
The second stage takes into account the survival of ﬁrms. These probabilities
are given by




The probability that a ﬁrm survives at time t + 1 conditional on its infor-
mation set at time t, Jt and ωt+1. This is equal to the probability that the
ﬁrm’s productivity is greater than a threshold,ωt+1, which in turn depends
on the capital stock. The survival probability can be written as a function of
investment and capital stock at time t. Thus, we estimate a probit regression
on a polynomial in investment and capital controlling for year speciﬁc eﬀects.
Now, consider the expectation yt+1 − βllt+1 conditional on the information at
25Table 6
Productivity function coeﬃcients
Sector Observations Labor Materials Capital Scale
17 4883 0.32 0.66 0.07 1.05
18 6526 0.45 0.59 0.05 1.09
19 2857 0.41 0.57 0.07 1.04
20 6209 0.19 0.82 0.03 1.04
21 1523 0.15 0.83 (0.02) 0.99
22 9010 0.18 0.80 0.06 1.04
24 2978 0.14 0.86 0.03 1.02
25 6097 0.20 0.78 0.06 1.04
26 4100 0.21 0.79 0.07 1.07
27 1501 0.13 0.83 0.06 1.02
28 15736 0.26 0.73 0.05 1.04
29 12104 0.26 0.73 0.02 1.01
30 662 0.42 0.60 0.17 1.19
31 3369 0.27 0.70 0.09 1.06
32 2568 0.27 0.74 0.07 1.08
33 3571 0.26 0.78 0.05 1.09
34 1466 0.28 0.75 0.02 1.05
35 558 0.35 0.78 (0.00) 1.13
36 5762 0.26 0.72 0.07 1.04
NB Figures in brackets are not signiﬁcant at one percent level of signiﬁcance.
time t and survival at t + 1.
E[yt+1 − βllt+1|kt+1,χt+1 = 1]=β0 + βkkt+1 + E[ωt+1|ωt,χt+1 = 1]
=βkkt+1 + g(ωt+1,ωt)
ωit follow an exogenous ﬁrst order Markov process. We substitute the produc-
tivity shock in the above equation using the result from the ﬁrst stage.
yt+1 − βllt+1 = βkkt+1 + g(Pt,Φt − βkkt) + ηt+1 + ǫit
The third step takes the estimates from βl, Φt, and Pt and substitutes them
for the true values. The series estimator is obtained by running a non-linear
least squares on the equation









where s is the order of the polynomial used to estimate the coeﬃcient on
capital.
267.3 Data
First note, that the APEH data provide information of ﬁrms with non-consolidated
accounts. Thus, a manufacturing ﬁrm can mostly be considered as an estab-
lishment: i.e. a headquarter and a plant. For details, see B´ ek´ es (2005).
This version of the dataset comes from the Central European University -
Labor Project and is based on a dataset managed by the Magyar Nemzeti
Bank. Several steps have been made to improve the consistency of the dataset.
The initial dataset were exhaustively cleaned by the CEU Labor Project and
the authors.
Non-surprisingly in a transition economy, ﬁrms frequently changed their at-
tributes. First, we had to deﬁne manufacturing ﬁrms and their sector classiﬁ-
cation to avoid ﬁrms appearing/disappearing based on their statistical status.
A sector was deﬁned based on the NACE 2-digit code a ﬁrm most often used.
A ﬁrm was kept in manufacturing if it spent 75% of its time in the sample
as a manufacturer. Second, longitudinal links for ﬁrms had to be improved
using data provided by Hungarian statistics oﬃce KSH on corporate entry
and exit. These are cases, when a ﬁrm changes its identiﬁcation code but re-
mains basically the same. This is especially frequent phenomenon in transition
economies such as Hungary, see Brown et al. (2006) Other longitudinal links
were investigated where ﬁrms did not simply appear under a new code but
actually split up into several ﬁrms or were formed via a merger. These allowed
keeping track of most but not all of ﬁrms under transformation. Further, small
ﬁrms (ones that never had as many as 5 employees) had to be dropped for
the well-documented lack of reliable data (see Katay and Wolf, 2006) We dis-
carded 58% of ﬁrms for missing or unreliable data. Otherwise, no outliers were
dropped.
We made several ﬁxes, too. Obvious typing errors were corrected. In order to
ensure that small ﬁrms are not dropped for missing data in employment or
ﬁxed assets, for missing years we replaced these variables with the mean of
their (t-1) and (t+1) values. This was the case for 1175 occasions for employ-
ment and 206 cases for ﬁxed assets. Ownership also had to be cleaned for the
large number of missing observations (ﬁlled in case of equality of the (t-1) and
(t+1) values) and typos.
The capital variable was created and corrected following suggestions in Katay
and Wolf (2004, 2006) Importantly, capital was recalculated by the perpetual
inventory method (PIM). The reason for this is that capital stock should
be registered at market prices. This is not the case in Hungary, where the
27stock enters the balance sheet on the book value. Without information on the
composition of the capital, actual data represents a mixture of various kinds of
assets in terms of age and readiness to use. Hence, the need to recompose the
capital stock by the PIM using an initial condition (i.e. ﬁrst year of investment)
and a capital accumulation equation to reconstruct the stock of capital. As
a result, investments are deﬂated by the investment price deﬂator, and then,
the rate of depreciation is used to get K, the capital stock. Thus:
Ki,t =Ki,t−1 ∗ (1 − Depreciationi,t) + Investmenti,t (3)








Capital Fixed assets capital generated and cor-
rected by the perpetual inventory method,




PPI Producer price deﬂator, sectoral level KSH
Ownership Foreign-owned ﬁrms: at least 10% of eq-
uity capital is owned by non-residents.
(NB. Distribution of the status is bimodal,




Private share Share of equity capital owned privately
(i.e. non-state and non-municipal owners
APEH: bal-
ance sheets
Export status Exporter ﬁrm is deﬁned if net export sales
reached at least 5% of total net sales. (NB.
Distribution of the status is bimodal, and
results are insensitive to the threshold.)
APEH:income
statements
Investments Change in ﬁxed assets, reduced by a sec-
tor speciﬁc depreciation rate calculated
from the data, deﬂated by investment in-






Estimated by authors based on 80% ma-
chinery and 20% property price deﬂators
KSH, authors
Depreciation rate Directly is estimated from the APEH
data. To see robustness of the APEH data,
an average of 20% was used, without size-
able impact
authors calc.




Materials All materials, calculated following Katay-
Wolf (2006) who advised on how to take
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